



The Role of Communities in Protecting Education from Attack: Lessons Learned

Global Coalition to
Protect Education from Attack





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The **Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack** was established in 2010 by organizations working in the fields of education in emergencies and conflict affected contexts, higher education, protection, international human rights, and humanitarian law who were concerned about ongoing attacks on educational institutions, their students, and staff in countries affected by conflict and insecurity.

GCPEA is a unique coalition of leading international organizations including:

- CARA
- Human Rights Watch
- Institute of International Education's Scholar Rescue Fund
- Norwegian Refugee Council
- Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
- Protect Education in Insecurity and Conflict
- Save the Children International
- Scholars at Risk Network
- United Nations Children's Fund
- United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization

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Acronyms

AWECO	<i>Comité pour le bien-être des femmes d'Afrique</i> - Africa Women Welfare Committee
CFS	Child Friendly Spaces
CCMEF	<i>Club des Mères des Filles</i> - Clubs of Mothers of School Girls
CNO	<i>Centre, Nord et Ouest</i> – Centre, North, and West Region of Côte d'Ivoire
CNPRA	<i>Comité national de pilotage du redéploiement de l'Administration</i> - National Committee to Manage the Redeployment of Government Administration
COGES	<i>Comité de Gestion des Etablissements Scolaires</i> - School Management Committee (SMC)
CPC	Child Protection Committees
DFID	UK Department for International Development
DRENET	<i>Direction Régionale de l'Education Nationale et de l'Enseignement Technique</i> - Regional Office for National Education and Technical Training
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Office
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
IEP	<i>Inspection de l'Enseignement Primaire</i> - Inspectorate of Primary Teaching
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IRC	International Rescue Committee
LIZoP	Learning Institutions as Zones of Peace
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MENET	<i>Ministère de l'Education Nationale et de l'Enseignement Technique</i> - Ministry of National Education and Technical Training
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MRM	Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism – The UN-led mechanism monitors six grave violations against children in situations of armed conflict in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions 1612 and 1882. These include: recruitment or use of children; killing and maiming; abduction; sexual violence; attacks on schools and hospitals; and denial of humanitarian access to children
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OFDA	Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
ONUCI	<i>Opération des Nations Unies en Côte d'Ivoire</i> - United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
PTA	Parent Teacher Association
PTUZ	Progressive Teachers Union of Zimbabwe
SIP	School Improvement Plan
SMC	School Management Committees
SMS	Short Message Service
SZoP	Schools as Zones of Peace
TLS	Temporary Learning Spaces
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund

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Children at a school in Aleppo, founded and supervised by a group of young Syrian community members, 17 March 2013.

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Introduction

Attacks on education occur in conflict-affected environments worldwide. Students and teachers are killed, injured, kidnapped, and threatened. Schools are bombed, burned, and taken over by armed groups to be used for military purposes. These attacks impede learning and stunt social and economic development. Protecting students, educators, and the buildings where they learn and teach is, therefore, imperative for both short and long term peace and stability.

There is some evidence that involving local communities in initiatives to protect education makes these efforts more effective. Indeed, assessments of programs to protect education indicate communities have a crucial role to play.¹ There are several reasons why engaging communities may be beneficial. First, in many conflict-affected countries, governments, though the ultimate duty bearers for ensuring education, lack the resources and capacity to fully protect education from targeted attacks on students, teachers, schools, and universities.² In such situations, measures taken by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and communities can usefully complement state actions, and also reduce dependence on centralized resources. Second, in settings where armed groups oppose the state, community engagement in measures to protect education from attack may help promote the appearance of political neutrality and, therefore, enhance security.³ This atmosphere of neutrality may also lessen the risk, in some cases, of governments and their allies themselves attacking schools, students, and personnel.⁴ In general, communities are often well placed to protect education. They may know and be able to negotiate with the real or potential attackers more effectively than external actors such as NGOs, government, or donors.⁵ Furthermore, encouraging local investment may boost ownership, making communities more likely to ensure the protection of education facilities at a later date.⁶

Indeed, much of what has been written on community engagement—often published by international agencies—assumes that working with members of local communities is inherently a good practice. However, a community-based approach to education protection programming may also present certain challenges and risks that should be recognized and addressed from the outset. Community mobilization processes may take time and require long-term commitments on behalf of NGOs and donors. They depend on strong and trusting relationships between agencies and local community members, as well as on a deep understanding of the local context on the part of external actors. Outside organizations must ensure that the responses they implement locally are compatible with human rights standards and do not exacerbate discrimination or prejudices existing within a community or endanger community members. Furthermore, the short-term funding frameworks that are available for rapid onset emergency response or conflict-affected, fragile environments may not be conducive to supporting actions that require long-term investment.⁷ And, finally, the voluntary nature of community involvement may lead to high turnover or lack of willingness to participate in programming.⁸ Thorough assessment and participation of community level stakeholders during the program planning stages may mitigate some of the risks to various stakeholders and individuals.

The goal of this paper is to serve as a guide for involving communities in protecting education in ways that harness the benefits and minimize the risks.

First, drawing on a global review of programming, it suggests a series of steps that should be taken when engaging communities in the protection of education. Where information is available, case studies have been included that demonstrate the challenges, and identify solutions and lessons learned for the different steps in the process. Subsequently, the paper looks at cross-cutting approaches that should be taken at all times when working with communities throughout the various programming stages. Next, the paper summarizes the results of research carried out in Côte d'Ivoire in September and October 2013, highlighting some advantages and challenges experienced at different steps in the process of engaging communities. The paper concludes with recommendations for different stakeholders.





Afghan students appointed to provide security at a school's entrance check bags as pupils arrive through its gate in Kabul, 25 August 2010.

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Terminology:

Attacks on education: Intentional threats or use of violent or coercive force against students, teachers, academics, and other education staff, education trade union members, government officials, or aid workers, and against schools, universities, and other educational institutions. Attacks on education are carried out for political, military, ideological, sectarian, ethnic, or religious reasons.

Military use of schools: The use of educational institutions by state military and security forces or by non-state armed groups, including for: barracks or bases; offensive or defensive positioning; storage of weapons or ammunition; interrogation or detention; military training or drilling of soldiers; military recruitment of children contrary to international law; or as observation posts or firing positions. The term does not include instances in which forces are present in the vicinity of schools and universities to provide for the school's protection, or as a security measure when schools are being used as election polling stations or other non-military purposes.

Protecting education:⁹ For the purpose of this paper, protection measures consist of actions to prevent, mitigate, and respond to attacks on education and military use of schools.

- Prevention actions include strengthening management of education, negotiation to prevent attack, development of codes of conduct or designation of schools as zones of peace, awareness-raising about education, national legislation, advocacy, adaptation of education delivery, physical strengthening of schools, appointment of night guards, day guards or security personnel, and popular protest.
- Damage mitigation efforts include contingency planning, safety and first aid training, and establishment of early warning systems.
- Response involves monitoring and reporting of attacks in order to prevent future attacks, negotiation to end military use of schools or to release kidnapped students or teachers, and reconstruction of schools.

Communities can be involved in all forms of protective action.

Community:¹⁰ In this paper, community denotes a group that recognizes itself, or that outsiders recognize, as sharing social, cultural, or religious characteristics, background, and interests, which contribute to a collective identity.

This paper considers communities in relation to specific sites of education. These communities may consist of:

- Children's clubs and groups
- School-aged children (both in and out of school)
- Youth
- Mothers' or fathers' groups
- Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs) and/or School Management Committees (SMCs)
- Teachers and school administrators (who may be both community members as well as government employees/representatives)
- Teachers' unions operating locally
- Religious, traditional, and community leaders

Community engagement: How communities play a role in protecting education can be considered according to the following typology (see Appendix 1):¹¹

- *Community-initiated:* Community members conceive of and set up program activities, based on parameters they establish, and community members manage, implement, and resource the projects.
- *Community-implemented:* Groups external to the community conceive of a project, but rely on communities to manage, support, or resource the activities.
- *Community-inspired:* Community members conceive of and develop projects, but communities rely on some form of external support (human resources, skills, knowledge, advocacy, or funding) to fully implement them.
- *Community-involved:* External organizations, donors, or governments use participatory processes to solicit community perspectives on program implementation. Communities may provide voluntary human resourcing to support initiatives on a one-off basis, but typically do not provide long-term support. No further efforts are made to include communities in decision-making, monitoring, management, or resourcing of the intervention.¹²

In reality, the lines between these different types of action are not always clearly established, nor are the relationships between them linear. This paper focuses primarily on how international organizations can implement community-involved and community-inspired action.

Methodology

This paper is based on a desk review of reports and evaluations from international and national NGOs, United Nations (UN) agencies, advocacy organizations, inter-agency bodies, research institutes, universities, and media sources. Additionally, actors engaged in efforts to prevent or respond to attacks on education in the countries where they occur were solicited for information and in some cases interviewed. Lessons and recommendations were drawn from: Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), India, Indonesia, Kenya, Lebanon, Liberia, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Syria, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. In addition to the desk review, a small case study was carried out in Côte d'Ivoire.

Concrete evidence of the effectiveness of community-based efforts to protect education from attack tends to be scant and impressionistic, without baseline data, comparative analysis, or representative or systematic sampling. This paper consolidates and adds to this existing knowledge with research from Côte d'Ivoire. Although initial telephone interviews indicated that local individuals and groups have been actively involved in preventing and responding to military use of schools and threats to children throughout Côte d'Ivoire's different crises, there has been limited documentation of these efforts (please see Appendix 4 for the methodology used to conduct the case study).¹³ Those working to protect education, both in Côte d'Ivoire and elsewhere, have valuable insights that indicate the advantages and challenges of employing different approaches when working with communities. This paper cannot be considered scientifically rigorous, but it synthesizes lessons from those implementing projects that protect education specifically, as well as children and the affected population more generally.

How to implement programs in collaboration with communities

Each setting is unique, and any intervention must be adapted to the specific political, cultural, and environmental context.¹⁴ However, understanding and documenting how communities have been engaged in different contexts reveals lessons learned that may assist those designing programs to protect education from attack. The following section breaks down, step-by-step, the process of working with communities. It synthesizes lessons learned about community participation in education protection activities. For each step in the process, where information is available, this section provides case study examples and identifies lessons learned, successes, and challenges faced

during the activity implementation process. It concludes with a summary of general program management approaches that are essential to the success of community-based programs to protect education from attack.

Mobilizing communities, step-by-step

This section outlines the main steps that may be taken to collaborate with communities. In addition to education, it draws on reports and studies from the sectors of protection, child protection, and health.¹⁵ The steps detailed are not chronological. Rather they may occur simultaneously or iteratively. The steps outlined are:

- (1) **Coordinating and collaborating**
- (2) **Mapping and power analysis**
- (3) **Creating social cohesion**
- (4) **Identifying issues of concern to community-level stakeholders**
- (5) **Creating wider ownership**
- (6) **Developing a plan**
- (7) **Monitoring, evaluating, and ensuring accountability**
- (8) **Carrying out a risk analysis**
- (9) **Allowing groups to organize themselves**
- (10) **Capacity strengthening, awareness raising, and/or social behavioral change**
- (11) **Resourcing and implementing the plan**
- (12) **Feeding back lessons learned to community groups**



Step 1: Coordinating and collaborating

Effective prevention and response to attacks on education involves collaboration among all education actors, as well as those from other sectors, including social welfare, health, and security. Mechanisms for coordination between these disparate groups are essential for reducing duplication of efforts, identifying gaps, and engaging community members and groups. Coordination methods should include inter-sectorial and sectorial meetings, sharing of information, joint assessment, and planning.

- *Coordination mechanisms as a first step in the Philippines' Learning Institutions as Zones of Peace:*¹⁶ In Mindanao, Philippines, the United

Students of a primary school in Colombia take shelter under their desks, 25 July 2011. The school is located near the heavily fortified local police station and has 600 students who have to take cover every time the FARC guerrillas attack.

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Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), in collaboration with local NGOs, the Department of Education, and conflict-affected communities, is implementing the Learning Institutions as Zones of Peace (LIZoP) project. The intervention engages community leaders, parents, teachers, state agencies and parties on opposite sides of the

conflict to enable children to access education in a safer and more secure environment. The first step that UNICEF took in implementing the project was to establish a mechanism for coordinating with other agencies to identify where they worked. This was considered essential to avoid duplication of work.

- *Ensuring the inclusion of all actors in Nepal: A similar intervention, Schools as Zones of Peace (SZoP), has been implemented in Nepal. In one school community in which the project was implemented, Maoists initially rejected the intervention. However, Maoists staying in the community became integrated into it through ongoing collaboration and relationship building, and they eventually acceded to the community's wishes to designate the school as a zone of peace.¹⁷ The example indicates the importance of ensuring that all parties to negotiation are equally engaged.*

Coordination must also happen at local, regional, and national levels. Relying solely on national level coordination may mean that some remote regions with unique needs feel excluded from decision-making.¹⁸ Where feasible and safe, community structures for coordination should be identified and linked to national and regional support systems to facilitate information sharing, such as on lessons learned. Information should travel in both directions. For example, national level legislation or policies should filter down to the regional and local levels so that they can be implemented. Conversely, information on local trends on attacks on education can inform national level analysis and shape policy development and decision-making.

- *Ugandan model of decentralized coordination and community integration:¹⁹ The UN Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) is implemented nationally. However, engaging community members ensures more comprehensive and timely reporting of incidents and enables data collection to be carried out in a more sensitive manner.²⁰ In Uganda, the MRM Taskforce²¹ engaged communities and others in MRM reporting by mapping out the different stakeholders who could help collect information. These included UN agencies, inter-agency humanitarian clusters, international non-govern-*

mental organizations (INGOs), service providers, and community-based groups.²² The Taskforce subsequently developed mechanisms for coordinating information sharing between it and each of these actors. This facilitated reporting on grave violations, including attacks on schools. These mechanisms included meetings held on a rotating basis in two locations: the nation's capital, Kampala, and the northern Gulu District. The fact that not all meetings were held in the capital enabled stronger relationships between the Taskforce and local NGOs in the North, which are more deeply rooted in the local communities where violations occur. The efforts were deemed successful and plans were made to expand this model of coverage to other locations in the country.

Furthermore, the Taskforce coordinated with local Child Protection Committees (CPCs), supported by external agencies, on data collection.²³ The Taskforce carried out training for CPC members, developed a form they could use for reporting, and set up a hotline that allowed groups to report directly to the Taskforce on all six 'grave violations' (recruitment or use of children; killing and maiming; abduction; sexual violence; attacks on schools and hospitals; and denial of humanitarian access to children).

Step 2: Mapping and power analysis

In initiating activities to mobilize communities in protecting education, a full mapping of community resources and a power analysis of local actors should take place.

Mapping: Mappings of community resources should consider pre-existing assets, mechanisms, structures, systems, leaders, and focal points. They should include identification of individuals who may be "natural helpers"—people from within the community whom children approach for advice, help and assistance—and groups that support children, such as PTAs, children's clubs, youth groups, or parent's groups. The mapping should consider what actions these actors are taking, how they organize themselves, and how to build on pre-existing activities to support children's educational needs. Through these activities, the effectiveness of community structures may be amplified. However, it is also important that these groups do not come to rely on



A teacher watches as Lebanese students take their entrance exam next to tents installed in the playground of a school that was damaged following Israeli forces' bombardment during the 34-day long Hezbollah-Israeli conflict, in the south of Lebanon, 9 October 2006.

© 2006 AP Photo/Mohammed Zaatar)

outside support and longer-term sustainable solutions are found.

- *Improving children's well-being and access to education in Northern Lebanon:*²⁴ A Save the Children project implemented to improve children's well-being and educational access during fighting in refugee camps in Northern Lebanon in 2007 included a mapping of organiza-

tions and institutions. This mapping enabled the organization to establish links between actors with diverse resources, formalizing a nascent pre-existing network and facilitating new linkages to support children and their education. The initial goal of providing referral services to 70 children was overwhelmingly successful, with more than 700 children reached by the end of the project. There was also evidence that local communities and organizations took full ownership of these initiatives and used their own resources to fill gaps in the limited services offered by the local authorities.

Power analysis: A power analysis is essential for identifying social groups that have the ability to influence others, or that are excluded from community decision-making.

- *Election of committee members in Nepal:*²⁵ Engagement of previously marginalized groups in school management through the SZoP initiative reduced threats to education, including lowering frequencies of military and political use of schools. A power analysis showed that previous school management structures were often dysfunctional, politicized, and prejudiced against cultural and linguistic minorities and women. This may have made schools more vulnerable to attacks during the ten-year conflict. UNICEF, in partnership with local administrators, parents, and community leaders, addressed the problem by supporting democratic election of representatives to school management committees and ensuring participation of excluded groups in the negotiation and enforcement of codes of conduct.

Step 3: Creating social cohesion

The mapping and power analysis carried out in Step 2 may identify points of community tension and conflict. The success of interventions implemented will rely on addressing these issues from the outset. Activities to create social cohesion may aid in this process and are important to carry out prior to implementing the full intervention. This may be particularly fundamental when it comes to protecting education, since the discord may reflect wider conflict dynamics. Building social cohesion can help disparate groups agree on their priorities, as outlined in Step 4, below. Additionally, members of groups with strong social cohesion may be more likely to participate and collaborate in educational interventions.

- *Community relationship building in West Timor:*²⁶ Save the Children invested resources in mitigating tension between local communities and displaced persons from Timor Leste. These included holding festivals and other informal activities to allow the different groups to talk, air grievances, and get to know each other. This work provided a strong foundation that allowed new or improved schools to be established to meet the needs of both communities.

Step 4: Identifying issues of concern to community-level stakeholders

It is essential to work with community groups and individuals to address their primary concerns for children and education. It may be useful to include in

these discussions general protection concerns, rather than just focusing on attacks on education. These may include food, health, water, and/or shelter. Incorporating broader concerns may make communities more inclined to engage, particularly when resource scarcity or inequality fuels conflict, and education is not seen as the highest priority for children.²⁷

- *Shared priorities in Zimbabwe:*²⁸ The Progressive Teachers' Union of Zimbabwe (PTUZ) found that involving parents, students, and teachers in discussions about their needs allowed for the development of mechanisms to protect teachers in a state where educators are often accused of political activism and repressed by the government and government-supported groups. PTUZ worked with School Development Committees,²⁹ which consisted of parents, and groups of teachers. However, the two groups had different priorities. The parents wanted the schools open and operating, while the teachers were more concerned with their personal safety. Discussions between the groups minimized the distrust that initially existed between them and enabled the establishment of voluntary Teacher-Student-Parent Defense Units. Through these, parents warned teachers of impending danger³⁰ and, at times, arranged evacuation by rapid response teams. Parents also intervened as mediators between would-be attackers and teachers.³¹ However, PTUZ reported that once their children had completed school, parents would lose interest in the group's activities, making it difficult to continue to engage some of the best negotiators and requiring on-going recruitment and training of new group members.³²

Children are a particular stakeholder group that should be engaged, especially when identifying issues of concern related to protecting education. Often children experience events differently than adults. Soliciting their views enables programs to address their needs more accurately and should be done using techniques that allow children of different ages, genders, and abilities to discuss their concerns (e.g. focus group discussions, theatre forums, role-playing, games, and other participatory activities).

One method for eliciting community concerns, including those of children, is through a needs assessment that



Syrian children attend a small makeshift school, set up for families who were scared to send their children far in the midst of war, in a village in northern Syria, 9 February 2013. The lessons are taught by a medical student whose own studies were cut short because of fighting.

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identifies education needs, local capacities, and the ways in which external actors, international and national NGOs, donors and government, might collaborate with communities to ensure children's right to education is protected. Needs assessments also help establish a baseline according to which program effectiveness can be monitored and evaluated.

- *Syrian crisis:*³³ In January 2013, an interagency humanitarian team, supported by the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), the UK

Department for International Development (DFID), and the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) carried out an intersectorial needs assessment to determine the consequences on education of the Syrian conflict between government and rebel groups.³⁴ The assessment³⁵ found that communities have begun responding to the crisis by developing local mechanisms for educating children. Local civilian councils and activist groups have established informal community schools in mosques and private homes in areas where government schools were destroyed or it is no longer safe to attend school. Inadequate educational resources have limited these efforts, but, because of the needs assessment, external actors can ensure that they complement rather than duplicate the communities' efforts.



A teacher holds an outdoor class under military guard on the outskirts of Mihtarlam, Afghanistan, where decades of war and conflict have destroyed hundreds of schools and colleges, 19 December 2012.

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Step 5: Creating wider ownership

Simultaneous to Step 4 above, programmers should cultivate a sense of common responsibility and ownership among community members. By recognizing and reiterating the contributions of different individuals and groups within the community, this stage may also reinforce a more inclusive approach to programming. Indeed, it is hypothesized that schools managed by committees comprised of community members from

different religious, ethnic, and linguistic groups tend to garner greater support from the community as a whole and be less vulnerable to attack.

Step 6: Developing a plan

External actors should work with the representative community groups and individuals to develop a joint plan that reflects community concerns, available resources, possible risks, and constraints. Subsequent intervention should follow these jointly agreed plans, since veering from them may fuel distrust and tension between external actors, school administration, and community groups, threatening the success of any activities to prevent attacks against schools. Additionally, all stakeholders should be made aware of the plans to ensure there is trust between different parties and accountability of all stakeholders.

From the beginning, there should be a system for transparently reviewing and revising plans in case the situation and priorities change. This is particularly important in conflict-affected contexts, where the political environment is dynamic and can have a significant impact on the education system, with schools closing, teachers being transferred, or curriculum amended. These changes should be taken into account when operationalizing plans.

- *Zimbabwe's model of community-based planning:*³⁶ SNV Netherlands Development Organization implemented a school-community planning process to contribute to school development. Through this process, community members and school staff identified and analyzed school development challenges and agreed on a plan through which the community could help develop the school. First, school heads, selected teachers, School Development Committee representatives, traditional leaders, councillors, and relevant district stakeholders from education, social welfare and local government departments were trained with relevant skills. Next, this group developed five to 10 year school development plans to address the main education challenges. They also developed a plan for implementing specific activities in each year. The plans helped the school communities identify funding partners, including UN agencies and NGOs. In addition, the planning process contributed to building trusting relationships between school staff and community members.
- *School improvement plans in Nepal:*³⁷ Save the Children supported School Management Committees (SMCs), PTAs, and students in carrying out a participatory school self-assessment that led to the development of School Improvement Plans. The midterm project evaluation found that all schools with the project had an improvement plan, in comparison with only three out of eight control schools. The Nepalese government requires these plans in order to access funding, so it is unlikely that only three schools had one. However, the findings could indicate a lack of community awareness, involvement, and ownership over the school improvement plans.

Step 7: Monitoring, evaluating (M&E) and ensuring accountability

Program plans should also include mechanisms for continuous monitoring, evaluation, and accountability to take place throughout the project. This should include repeated assessment of the level of participation by different community groups, including marginalized ones, to ensure that it is appropriate for the project design. Community members, including children should participate in the M&E process; involving a wide range of stakeholders at each stage of project implementation has been associated with overall improved program impact.³⁸ Where possible and appropriate, community members may lead aspects of the M&E process so that their perspectives influence the design process more fully. On-going monitoring, assessment, and evaluation can enable early identification of tensions that might create greater risks for education.

- *A flower of understanding in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC):* In the DRC, Save the Children conducted an evaluation of the challenges in their M&E and accountability systems. The evaluation uncovered a need to change the design of data collection tools. For example, one challenge identified was that in carrying out evaluation research, children and their families did not want to give written consent. In response, Save the Children staff were trained on ways to teach communities about informed, confidential, and voluntary consent. They developed a “flower of understanding” tool to accompany the discussion, in which thumbprints of those consenting replaced the written consent form. Without the evaluation, this problem would not have been uncovered and addressed.

Accountability mechanisms, in particular, are essential for ensuring that a program meets the needs of affected beneficiaries, the priorities of different groups are balanced, and staff do not engage in inappropriate behaviour. Any project should include mechanisms for community members to share relevant concerns so that these issues can be addressed. A lack of accountability mechanisms may fuel distrust between communities and external actors, leading to program failure. This is particularly the case with vulnerable populations, including children who may be more susceptible to abuse and exploitation.³⁹ Establishing a system for

children to report such incidents is vital since adult community members may not be aware of all the abuses faced by children.

- *Child friendly complaints and response mechanism in Dadaab, Kenya:*⁴⁰ Save the Children piloted a child friendly complaints mechanism in Ifo refugee camp in Dadaab. The mechanism involved consultation with children to understand how comfortable they were giving feedback, ‘feedback’ desks where children could report complaints,⁴¹ beneficiary reference groups⁴² established to proactively solicit and give feedback to the community, group discussions with boys and girls separately, children’s club meetings, feedback boards, and drawing competitions. An evaluation of the feedback mechanism indicated four features that may make a complaint mechanism more effective. It should: (1) be informed by children’s ideas and needs, (2) be located somewhere safe and confidential, as well as be easily accessible and known to children, (3) use child friendly language, and (4) be managed by people trained to work with children, including on child friendly ‘interviewing,’ active listening, tolerance and patience.
- *Challenges in implementing complaints mechanisms:*⁴³ An INGO in Pakistan set up a complaints mechanism as one component of an emergency child labor prevention program. This included hotlines, regular field monitoring visits, focus groups with children and adults, and separate forms and systems for children to submit feedback. However, a year and a half into the program, it was found that no children had used the separate systems for reporting. Had there been regular review of the system, the lack of use may have been identified sooner and solutions may have been found.

Step 8: Carrying out a risk assessment

The process of preventing and responding to attacks against education may be extremely risky, both for those reporting cases and for those implementing protective programming. Risks have been reported to be especially high when engaging communities in the MRM,⁴⁴ supporting communities involved in negotiations with armed groups and forces (including for the development of codes of conduct),⁴⁵ and when individuals or groups

carry out advocacy or protests.⁴⁶ A full assessment of risks to staff, community members, and children must take place prior to protection activities, and on-going risk assessment should take place over the course of a project. The risk assessment should identify possible threats, their probability, and means to mitigate them. Program plans should include activities to minimize risks.

- *Negotiations in Nepal:* In Nepal, the risks to individuals involved in negotiations have been mitigated by holding secret, ‘back-door’ or informal negotiations. These allowed groups comprised predominantly of women to negotiate with Maoists in a more discrete and less exposed manner.⁴⁷
- *The MRM in Nepal:* Communities in Nepal have also been involved in the MRM, where field level respondents have reported that monitoring grave violations under the MRM framework is particularly risky because of the level of detail and verification requirements. In Nepal, the MRM Country Taskforce, co-chaired by UNICEF and the Office of High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR), and consisting of other UN agencies, INGOs, and local NGOs, was established in November 2005 to systematically document and report on grave violations against children.⁴⁸ The Taskforce developed and put in place guidelines and a code of conduct to ensure the safety of monitors and victims. Monitors were regularly trained on personal and data security. Contacts with influential individuals in affected communities facilitated access and dialogue with victims in families, which helped protect the monitors. And in cases where monitoring was deemed risky to the point of injury or death, monitors were removed from the case. Monitors also always made sure their respective district, regional, and central offices were aware of threats received.⁴⁹

Step 9: Allowing groups to organize themselves

Although external actors may suggest the establishment of management committees or structures, allowing community groups to organize and arrange these in a manner that suits them is important for encouraging long-term momentum and sustainability. Community groups should, themselves, decide who should participate and lead activities, who should take on what roles

and responsibilities, how often groups should meet, and how work should be administered. External actors may give guidance throughout the process, presenting options such as elections for a selection process, working group structures, or descriptions of roles like treasurer, secretary, or president. They may also help ensure that principles like equality and non-discrimination are maintained. It is important to find a balance between allowing communities to organize themselves and making certain that interventions are consistent with human rights standards. For example, if the structures community members choose reinforce structural biases and exclusions, external agencies may present alternative options that address entrenched power dynamics. This may allow community members to recognize these concerns themselves and find solutions suitable to their contexts.

Depending on context, groups may organize themselves in different ways. In some situations, excluded groups may prefer parallel decision-making structures. These may reassure those who are marginalized that their voices are given equal weight and contribute to decision-making.

Step 10: Capacity strengthening, awareness-raising, and/or social behavioural change communication

Once a community and its partners have developed a plan, organizational structures, and focal points, it is important to jointly determine learning or capacity strengthening needs. Communities should help identify these needs rather than external groups imposing subjects and strategies for social or behavioural change and learning. Some of this information may have been gathered during needs assessment processes, or during meetings with community groups and individuals. Based on these needs, a capacity building, awareness-raising, and behavioural change strategy should be developed.

- *Capacity building efforts in Gaza:*⁵⁰ Following escalating violence in the Gaza Strip in December 2008 and January 2009 during Operation Cast Lead, Save the Children implemented a project that aimed to engage community mechanisms in improving the protection of Palestinian children affected by armed conflict. A component of this project was training of members of organizations running Child Friendly Centers and engaged in the Child Protection Network. However, capacity

building was limited by the fact that many individuals who attended initial trainings later changed jobs. The evaluation indicated that capacity building should have been more carefully planned, integrating regular review and risk mitigation strategies into the plans.

- *Bal Bandhus (child rights defenders) in India:*⁵¹ India's National Commission for Protection of Child Rights launched a three-year pilot, the Bal Bandhu Scheme for Protection of Child Rights in Areas of Civil Unrest,⁵² to address conflict experienced in remote locations in parts of Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Assam, Maharashtra, and Bihar, which has disrupted children's education and led to military use of schools. The success of the program hinged on selecting resource persons⁵³ to help choose Bal Bandhus, or child rights defenders. Chosen with community support, the Bal Bandhus attended three-day training sessions during which they visited existing, successful community-driven initiatives in order to learn techniques for garnering community support. They then returned to their communities, and between December 2010 and March 2012 were successful in organizing marches and rallies, writing community letters of protest, and meeting with officials. These actions may have been one factor that led to the vacating of schools by police or armed forces and the return of large numbers of children to school.

In order to successfully participate in activities protecting education, communities must be aware of the content of the programs and of the expectations.


- *Awareness-raising in the Philippines:*⁵⁴ In Mindanao, the public signing of the codes of conduct agreed to at the school or community-level ensured that all community members were aware of the accords. This enabled a wider set of people to be involved in holding parties to conflict to account.

Awareness-raising on the value of education may be particularly important. In some social settings, what is perceived as "Western style" education may be viewed negatively. For example, the popular name of the Nigerian group "Boko Haram," literally translates to "western education is sinful." Media reports indicate that the group may have some popular support in the north of the country.⁵⁵ In a context like this, communities



A pupil at a bush school in Central African Republic. In this area in the northwest, around 80% of children had to abandon school completely to flee fighting between the government and armed rebels in 2008.

© 2009 Simon Davis/Department for International Development



may be ideologically aligned with those who attack education. Community support for and ownership of education may, therefore, enable more effective protection of education. While difficult to cultivate, external actors may take several actions to build community support for education, including engaging in long term-intervention and relationship-building, using role models to demonstrate the value of education and encourage community support for education, and collaborating with local NGOs.⁵⁶

Step 11: Resourcing and implementing the plan

The resources to be provided and methods for implementing protection projects should be jointly agreed upon by all stakeholders, including community representatives. Community members and groups must be given the opportunity to identify and propose the resource contributions they are able to make. Community provided resources may include: individual or group time, a meeting place, administration or management activities, transport, or materials. Mobilizing community level resources can be vital in the humanitarian contexts in which education is under-funded.⁵⁷ Once resourcing responsibilities are agreed upon, the plan, as developed together in Step 6, may be implemented.

- *Community appointed guards in Liberia⁵⁸ and Afghanistan:⁵⁹* In Liberia, several communities in the north of the country contributed unarmed guards as a cost-effective and sustainable protection mechanism, which made teachers and students feel safe. In Afghanistan, some communities later took over the responsibility for resourcing community guards to protect schools, and community members sometimes supported assigned guards with patrolling at night.
- *Bush schools in Central African Republic:⁶⁰* Humanitarian organizations in the CAR have implemented “bush schools” as an emergency education response in conflict-affected communities that lack open schools or qualified teachers. These temporary school structures have been set up in areas of displacement and villages deemed secure. UNICEF and partner NGOs have trained parents to work with teachers (known in French as *maître-parents*). They also have

trained parents' associations to manage payment of school fees and *maître-parents'* salaries and to provide students with textbooks and other school materials. Where communities have not had the money, they have sometimes paid salaries “in-kind” by farming land or providing agricultural products from their harvest.

Step 12: Feeding back lessons learned

A mechanism for ensuring that any lessons learned, decisions made, and outcomes achieved are shared with all stakeholders throughout the project cycle will help maintain engagement of community groups and retain trust between different stakeholders. Frustration and a lack of trust can prevent plans from progressing and being properly implemented.

- *Volunteer frustration in Gaza:* Volunteers engaged in the Save the Children program to improve the well-being of children in Gaza and Lebanon expressed frustration that their international partners did not provide any feedback on the effect of their work.⁶¹

Cross cutting strategies and approaches

Certain strategies for engaging communities should be considered throughout all project cycles in order to build positive working relationships at the local level. The following approaches are relevant to each of the 12 steps discussed above. They include staffing, partnerships and child participation, and the principle of do no harm.

Staffing the program team

Staff working to implement the education protection project or program should have the language skills and cultural understanding to work with the community in question, and their religious, political, ethnic, and linguistic make-up should be representative of the populations they will be working with. Recruiting a paid staff team entirely from one ethnic, religious or linguistic group to work with a different ethnic, religious, or linguistic group may exacerbate pre-existing tensions if these are a cause of conflict. It may be preferable to recruit from within the community or among individuals with similar cultural background and languages for the positions that work most closely with those communities. Doing so can ensure community ownership, create stronger relationships, enable better adaptation of programming to local conditions, empower the local

population, and enhance sustainability. However, it must be done in a way that is not discriminatory and maintains neutrality to the greatest degree possible so that the project or school is not viewed as associated with a particular party to conflict.⁶²

Working with and through local NGO partners

Working with and through local NGO partners may be a good method for engaging communities. In some contexts, working with international actors may endanger community groups. For example, in Afghanistan, association with particular international donors can increase risk.⁶³ In other contexts, local NGOs may have stronger knowledge of and more established and longer-term relationships with communities. In developing codes of conduct, for instance, UN agencies and INGOs have had success in engaging communities through local partners, whose staff speak local languages and understand the context.⁶⁴ Furthermore, engaging NGO partners may enable on-going program monitoring that could not be achieved by external actors, without very high resource investment. For some more detailed case examples of working through and with local NGOs, see Appendix 2.

Child Participation

As noted in several of the steps above, engaging the perspective and input of children can ensure that their priorities are addressed. Children's views should be sought throughout the intervention process, from identifying needs and setting priorities to evaluation project outcomes. Special systems should be put in place to ensure children's inclusion. These may include recruiting and training staff with skills for working with children, adapting communications materials and tools to different age groups, and organizing activities in a way that is engaging, welcoming, and appropriate for children (e.g. holding events at times of day that are accessible and safe for children). For some more detailed examples of ensuring child participation in programming, in particular, guidance on including children's input in the MRM system, see Appendix 3.

Adapting programming to context

The project implementation process and each of its components should be adapted to the individual community in which an intervention is implemented. Implementing activities in a way that contravenes culture and traditions may breed distrust and tension,



A teacher plays ball with Syrian refugee kids in the school grounds in Lebanon, September 5, 2013. This educational program is sponsored by UNICEF and executed by a Lebanese NGO.

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ensure actions are tailored to context, achieve sustainability, and gain credibility with parties to a conflict. The next section of this paper explores in depth how UN agencies and INGOs in Côte d'Ivoire have engaged communities to protect education, providing examples of each step in the process where relevant.


which is particularly problematic in situations of conflict. Decisions about project materials, staffing, and programming techniques should take into account cultural, political, religious, ethnic, and linguistic differences between communities. Engaging communities early in the planning process, as well as in on-going monitoring and evaluation, can facilitate the adaptation of program design.⁶⁵

As discussed in these steps, working with communities may make the work of external actors in protecting education more effective. It may help reduce costs,



A poll worker marks votes for former president Henri Konan Bedie on a school blackboard during vote counting at a polling station in northern Côte d'Ivoire, 31 October 2010.

© 2010 AP Photo/Rebecca Blackwell



Côte d'Ivoire: how communities have worked with UN agencies and INGOs

In recent years, Côte d'Ivoire has been plagued by sporadic political and ethnic violence, which peaked in 2002 and then again in 2010, following contested elections.⁶⁶ From 2007 until the 2010 elections, the country was divided between the government, which controlled the south, and the *Forces Armées - Forces Nouvelle* (FAFN), which controlled the center, north, and west of the country (referred to as CNO, *Centre, Nord, et Ouest*). A buffer zone, the *Zone de Confiance* (the Zone of Confidence), separated the country in two.⁶⁷ Since 2010, the government of President Alassane Ouattara has administered the whole country.

The CNO region in particular has continued to be significantly poorer than the rest of the country with its education system badly affected by conflict. The 2002-2003 crisis was most intense in the west of the country, and huge numbers of people migrated from the north to the south. The government called for teachers to move to the government-controlled south, and education budgets to the CNO remained frozen for years, draining the north of education provided by professionals.⁶⁸ The quality of education deteriorated, and the cost of education, where schools remained open, fell upon parents.⁶⁹

Furthermore, in the CNO and across Côte d'Ivoire, schools have been damaged and looted, and armed groups and state forces have used them for housing, ammunitions and weapons storage, and as mass graves.⁷⁰ In total, during 2011, 477 schools were affected, depriving an estimated 67,500 children of education.⁷¹ Across the country, school closures lasted anywhere from a few days to five months,⁷² with the regions of Moyen-Cavally, Haut-Sassandra in the west, and Lagunes in the south, worst-affected.⁷³ During the 2010-2011 crisis, there were also reports of kidnappings and knife attacks against school directors, teachers, and students.⁷⁴ In this context, communities have played a role in protecting education by engaging in negotiations

with non-state armed groups and state armed forces, escorting children to school, setting up alternatives to formal education, and participating in school reconstruction.

This section presents a case study of community involvement in the protection of education in Côte d'Ivoire. Information for the case study was collected in-country, through interviews, focus group discussions, and visits to three conflict-affected communities (one urban, two rural). Respondents included *Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale et de l'Enseignement Technique* (MENET) officials, UN agency staff,⁷⁵ NGO staff,⁷⁶ *Direction Régionale de l'Éducation Nationale et de l'Enseignement Technique* (DRENET) officials, members of local *Comité de Gestion des Établissements Scolaires* (COGES) or school management committees, school principals, teachers, community leaders, children, and parents (see Appendix 4 for more details on the case study methodology).⁷⁷

Key findings: Actions to protect education from attack

Community visits, focus groups, and interviews conducted for the case study demonstrated that communities in Côte d'Ivoire are engaged in efforts to prevent, mitigate, and respond to attacks on education. The following are the main methods for protecting education that communities have used.

- Prevention
 - *Sending children to school in groups and/or accompanied by parents:* In the urban community, students and parents reported that pupils would initially travel to and from school in groups as a safety precaution even before the crisis. Some mothers said that following the crisis, they accompanied the groups of students as an additional safety measure. Later, successful negotiations between the school principal and commanding officers in the area eliminated the need for group travel and escorts for the students.
 - *Redeployment of teachers at risk:* Following the 2002-2003 crisis, the government redeployed all civil servants, including teachers to the CNO areas. Teachers received





Children attend primary school in western Côte d'Ivoire, May 2011. At that time, only a third of the teachers had returned since the school had reopened.

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Damage to a school building located near the military camp of Akouedo is seen following fire from U.N. and French military aircraft aimed at troops loyal to Côte d'Ivoire's incumbent president in Abidjan, 10 April 2011.

© 2011 REUTERS/Thierry Gouegnon

financial incentives to return to their posts in the CNO.⁷⁸ Interviewees described this effort as protective because the presence of teachers allowed schools to remain open. Participants reported that schools that remained closed were more likely to be attacked and/or used for military purposes.

- Mitigation
 - *Use of short message service (SMS) between students to monitor well-being and send*

warnings: Students and parents in urban areas reported using mobile phone communication as part of informal early warning systems during and after the 2011 crisis. Students called friends and family to check on their safety and find out about the situation, and women used mobile phones to confirm the safety and well-being of their children. When fighting was bad and it was difficult to obtain phone credit, some network operators provided free airtime to their customers.

- Response
 - *Monitoring and reporting of attacks against schools and advocacy:* In Côte d'Ivoire, participants reported that data collected under the

MRM has informed national and international advocacy initiatives. MRM data from Côte d'Ivoire has indicated that schools there were more likely to be used for military purposes when they were closed for long periods of time. UN agencies, NGOs, and community level actors have tried to reopen schools as quickly as possible following crises in order to prevent this type of use, and they have engaged in advocacy to this end.

- *Negotiation with armed groups and forces using schools:* In several cases where schools were used for military purposes, communities reported negotiation between school directors, COGES members and leaders, and soldiers, zone commanders, or regional Sous Prefet (Sub Prefect) for the removal of security personnel from the schools. Preliminary telephone interviews to COGES in affected regions found that ten out of 20 communities contacted had engaged in this type of negotiation, with mixed outcomes. In one of the three villages visited, there were community-led negotiations to remove the armed forces from school facilities that they were using for military purposes. These negotiations were partially effective. Violent incidents were reduced and some troops left, but others stayed in the school. (See below example for Step 8: Carrying out a risk assessment for more details on negotiations in this community.)
- *Temporary learning spaces (TLS) and alternative forms of education delivery:* A range of international actors have supported the establishment of non-formal education centers in Côte d'Ivoire as alternative mechanisms for maintaining education for children. Actors including, UNICEF, Save the Children, the International Rescue Committee (IRC), and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) have coordinated with communities to implement TLS and accelerated learning programs in the CNO regions of the country where children were unable to access formal education in areas under FAFN control. COGES and parents in one rural community visited for this study reported building *apatams* (temporary structures made from bamboo) so that damaged schools could resume classes. These informal education structures may be less likely to be attacked than formal schools because they are not associated with the government and have less permanent infrastructure, and because communities may feel greater ownership over them.⁷⁹ In addition, where community dissatisfaction with the lack of government service provision in CNO areas breeds violence, these alternative education forms may contribute to longer-term stability by maintaining children's access to education. Among all of the protective measures found in Côte d'Ivoire, Ivorian communities were most active in supporting alternative delivery of education. As reported in all three sites, community members facilitated independent study during school closures, or, as reported in two sites in each location, they mobilized themselves to take up the role of teachers (reported in both the rural locations) or to help construct TLS.
- *Rehabilitation of school buildings:* Community members have provided labor and materials to rehabilitate school buildings damaged by attack. Communities also were involved in fundraising for the rehabilitation of school buildings in two locations visited. One rural community reported that villagers contributed financially to projects otherwise funded by the World Bank. They provided five percent of the construction budget for a teachers' house and another five percent to rehabilitate a three-classroom building. Parents also donated their time and labor to maintain the school—for example, by cutting the grass. In another rural community, female community members contributed to a Solidarités project rehabilitating two classrooms by providing water and carrying sand.

These examples highlight instances where Ivorian communities were successful in protecting education, but also illustrate several failures. Significantly, some of the most significant ways in which communities act to protect education (e.g. escorting students, using SMS for warning, and negotiating with armed groups) have been done independently of external involvement.



A female facilitator draws with Ivorian children, who had taken refuge in Liberia with their family, at a Child Friendly Space (CFS) run by Save the Children.

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Indeed, communities reported a lack of trust in international agencies and government actors, which occasionally impeded cooperation. As the next section shows, engaging communities according to the steps discussed in this paper may help address communities' concerns.

Steps for engaging communities and lessons learned in Côte d'Ivoire

Research in Côte d'Ivoire demonstrates the advantages and challenges of many of the steps of community collaboration. The illustrations below include examples where steps were taken effectively, generating positive outcomes, as well as instances where steps were missed, with negative repercussions. For one of the steps (6: Developing a plan), no example was found.

- Step 1: Coordination:* The researchers found several cases where insufficient coordination among international and local actors increased communal tensions and decreased the effectiveness of efforts to protect education. In one community visited, NGOs failed to coordinate their efforts, leading agencies to compete with each other for community participation. The NGOs gave varying stipends in exchange for participation, making some more “popular” among community members than others. Increased coordination among these NGOs could have mitigated these problems.

In another example, insufficient coordination among potential stakeholders resulted in inadequate monitoring of attacks on education. Although the MRM mandates monitoring attacks on school buildings as well as on individuals, no systems for monitoring attacks against individuals were found in Côte d'Ivoire. Closer collaboration between education and child protection actors could have facilitated reporting on attacks against students, teachers, and other education staff. For example, education actors could work with CPCs, which already have mechanisms for reporting and managing data collected on individuals who experience violence and abuse. Training the community-based CPCs on grave violations relating to education would enable them to identify and report on attacks against education.

- *Step 2: Mapping and power analysis:* Insufficient mapping of efforts that Ivorian communities were already engaged in to protect their children and schools meant that external actors failed to identify opportunities to enhance these efforts. Indeed, initiatives such as parent escorts of children to and from school or the use of mobile phone technologies for early warning are innovations that international organizations could build on. For example, in Côte d'Ivoire, the majority of the population has access to a mobile phone,⁸⁰ and its use for information dissemination has strong potential. Students and parents reported using SMS systems informally to warn each other of attacks and to monitor others' well-being. Had international organizations carried out a thorough mapping of the communities, they may have recognized the actions that the communities were already taking to use mobile phones to identify threats and have been able to create programming that built on them by creating a more structured warning system that formalized communication trees at school-level. This could be a feasible, low cost, and effective way to build an early warning system against attacks. Similarly, research in Côte d'Ivoire indicated that study groups can be an effective way to maintain education and keep teachers and students safe. The government, UN agencies, and INGOs could invest in developing modules and programs that can be accessed remotely using technology, including the Internet and mobile phones.
- *Step 3: Creating social cohesion:* Two examples from Côte d'Ivoire illustrate the importance of social cohesion and how it can facilitate access to a protective and peaceful education environment. One rural community in the west of the country consists of several different religious and ethnic groups, as well as various nationalities—a consequence, in part, of waves of internally displaced populations settling in or near it. Because of this diversity and the pressure of newcomers, the community was the site of significant internal tensions following the 2003 and 2011 crises.

Local and international NGOs (including Solidarite, Handicap International, and IRC) with the support of UNHCR, tried to address the

problem of social cohesion by implementing community athletics days, trainings, workshops, and cultural activities. A local NGO (AWECO) also established a Peace Committee in the village. The members of the Peace Committee received training and support on conflict mediation and subsequently implemented community awareness raising workshops, helped repair community relationships, and strengthen community cohesion. These activities allowed community members to come to agreements on several issues of difference, including the construction of a new school that opened in 2013.

In addition, across Côte d'Ivoire, the government has implemented peace and reconciliation initiatives at schools. Following the most recent crisis, MENET held a workshop encouraging all teachers and school administrators to ensure that their school atmospheres were safe and politically neutral after schools reopened. One school principal reported building on what he had learned at the workshop by holding meetings with community and religious leaders on cultivating peaceful relationships within the community that would enable children to resume classes in a safe and peaceful environment.


- *Step 4: Identifying issues of concern to community-level stake holders (including children):* When they speak with all community-level stakeholders, external actors in Côte d'Ivoire are able to make sure that they are aware of the priorities and concerns of all groups. For example, some interviewees reported that by speaking with groups of boys and girls separately, they were able to find out that secondary school boys were particularly concerned about recruitment into armed forces and groups, while adolescent girls were wary of sexual violence. Without having spoken to these different groups of children, the distinct issues they face would not have been known.
- *Step 5: Creating wider ownership:* The research carried out in Côte d'Ivoire underscored the importance of cultivating community ownership and positive attitudes that sustain education in times of crisis. Interestingly, interviews indicated greater parental participation and ownership of

schools in rural than in urban areas—a finding that might be attributable to the fact that there are fewer educational options in rural communities. Parents in urban areas tended to have greater awareness of their rights, demand more of the state, and demonstrate less commitment to support schools. As was demonstrated in these communities, the greater a sense of ownership a community has over its education, the more likely its members are to invest in protecting the education system by providing human resources (e.g. volunteer teachers and unarmed volunteer guards), construction materials, or space for temporary schools, or to engage in negotiations to protect their schools.

- *Step 6: Developing a plan:* No example of step six was found in Côte d'Ivoire.
- *Step 7: M&E and ensuring accountability:* A couple of examples from Côte d'Ivoire show that monitoring programs and holding stakeholders accountable are essential activities—particularly for building trusting relationships between community members and external agencies that enable effective programming. Trust was a concern that arose commonly in focus group discussions, with participants reporting that lack of trust impeded collaboration between communities, school administration, NGOs, and UN agencies. For example, one community reported an example in which an international agency transferred funds directly to a school principal, bypassing the COGES and making it impossible for parents to monitor the funds. The funds later went missing, straining the relationship between the community and the agency. On the other hand, the World Food Program engaged parents in monitoring and distributing food at one community's school, reportedly improving relations between the school administration and the community because parents appreciated knowing how donations were used and distributed. These examples show how important it is for external agencies to increase parental responsibility and engage parents in school management processes.
- *Step 8: Carrying out a risk assessment:* Negotiations that took place in several Ivorian communities show that, although there are limits to what a risk assessment may uncover, real risks do exist. It is critical to consider these when engaging in sensitive activities. Indeed, the success of local negotiations varied greatly depending on highly context-specific factors. In one case, community members ended up fleeing after being threatened by the soldiers they were negotiating with over the use of the school. In another case, negotiations resulted in unarmed fighting between villagers and soldiers. However, other cases were more successful. In one rural village, an armed group led by Liberians and Sierra Leoneans took over the teachers' lodgings and a military checkpoint was built close to the school. The armed groups threatened and physically beat the principal and teachers. The village chief, who had lived in Liberia for many years, negotiated for them to vacate the premises, offering a goat. While the armed group stayed, they reduced the number of troops, and the community reported a reduction in the number of violent incidents. As these examples demonstrate, negotiations may be highly risky. Without assessing these risks, organizations interested in facilitating negotiations could end up fuelling tensions between community members and armed groups; or, alternatively, they could end up not being able to take advantage of factors that could facilitate negotiations.
- *Step 9: Allowing groups to organize themselves:* Save the Children and UNICEF have engaged marginalized groups like children and mothers by supporting children's and mothers' clubs in primary schools throughout Côte d'Ivoire. However, their efforts demonstrate the challenges in allowing groups to organize themselves while at the same time ensuring that all relevant stakeholders are empowered to participate. Across Côte d'Ivoire, Save the Children helped establish children's clubs, training a child-selected mentor and explaining to other stakeholders, such as school directors, SMC members, teachers, and parents, the objectives of the clubs. However, it was found that while the children's clubs were effective in raising awareness of rights and protection concerns, the direct engagement of children in school

management committees, as mandated by a government decree, is tokenistic at best. Although the children's club presidents are officially members of a school's management committee, in reality, they are not always invited to meetings and are given few opportunities to express their views.

- *Step 10: Capacity strengthening, awareness-raising, and/or other social behavioural change communication:* An intervention carried out by Save the Children in Côte d'Ivoire illustrates how raising local community awareness about education can help effectively protect students, teachers, and schools. As part of its *Rewrite the Future* program,⁸¹ Save the Children has encouraged communities in Côte d'Ivoire to implement security measures, with the goal of increasing access to school and improving the quality of education. Project planning involved raising awareness among school directors, teachers, children's clubs, and parents. Initial events were targeted at children and COGES, after which children and teacher mentors developed their own awareness-raising activities (on education, child rights, and protection) targeted at the whole community. Subsequently, Save the Children, along with parents, children, teachers, and COGES, identified the resources that the community could contribute to school protection.⁸² Communities helped provide volunteer guards and improve school enclosures, fencing, gates, and doors, and children helped fundraise for school construction.
- *Step 11: Resourcing and implementing the plan:* In Côte d'Ivoire, community resources have been vital for protecting education. For instance, communities have supported the alternative delivery of education, including managing the sites (day-to-day supervision and budget support), providing suitable spaces, and constructing makeshift or temporary buildings. In comparison to urban locations, the rural communities visited reported providing more resources to support alternative learning spaces, including in-kind payments, as well as provision of materials for and participation in school construction.





Soldiers from the 'Invisible Commandos' practice ambush techniques at a middle school serving as a base in the PK-18 area of the Abobo neighbourhood in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, 19 April 2011.

© 2011 AP Photo/Rebecca Blackwell

Furthermore, one of the most important ways that communities have contributed to alternative learning is through the provision of volunteer teachers. Volunteer teachers were pivotal after the attempted coup of 2002, since, even after government education personnel began to be redeployed, staff shortages remained and trained teachers were unwilling to work in areas controlled by the FAFN. Teachers were often parents or students who had completed their high school certificates. Depending on their location, they may have received training and technical support from education ministry staff in regional offices or NGOs. The government also provided training modules for untrained teachers, and while communities initially paid teachers with either cash, in-kind, or field labor, the government later began to integrate them into their payroll. However, reliance on volunteer

teachers has tended to reduce the quality of education that students in the CNO areas receive. Even those students who have completed and passed their baccalaureate still face discrimination if they try to further their education in Abidjan because of the assumption that they are not well trained. In response, existing non-formal education programs in Côte d'Ivoire are being harmonized, training is being given to educators to ensure quality, and the government is recognizing the value of these alternative forms of education. In collaboration with the Ministry of Education, the NRC is developing national guidelines to standardize implementation practices in bridging programs helping children in little served areas to access services. These efforts to ensure more equitable access to education are important given that lack of service provision, such as of education, in the CNO areas has been

How the step by step process works in practice:

The IRC's model of community involvement in school rehabilitation in Côte d'Ivoire

Research in Côte d'Ivoire uncovered a strong example of collaboration between communities and an international NGO.⁸³ The NGO initially contacted the village in January 2010 and held a community meeting about implementing the project. According to IRC staff, “elders, youth, women... everyone was there” (*STEP 5 - Creating wider ownership*). The community was asked to prioritize a project (*STEP 4 – Identifying issues of concern to community-level stakeholders*) and decided they wanted to refurbish their school, which had been damaged during the 2002 crisis and subsequently deteriorated through general disrepair.

When the community was notified the project would go ahead in February 2010, a community rehabilitation committee was set up to support the project. The committee had to send out a request for bids for the construction project, organize committee members' participation in reconstruction,⁸⁴ and generate 5% of the funding themselves (*STEP 9 - Allowing groups to organize themselves and Step 11 - Resourcing and implementing the plan*). The NGO trained the committee on monitoring and evaluation, including reporting requirements (*STEP 7 - M&E and STEP 10 - Capacity strengthening*).

Construction finally began in October 2010, but was interrupted by the 2010-2011 crisis, during which the school's doors were broken, desks were stolen, and the teacher's lodges used and damaged by armed forces. The contractor fled for safety. To restart the project, the community had to send out a second tender. They did this on their own initiative.

one source of political tension, conflict, and violence in Côte d'Ivoire.

- *Step 12: Feeding back lessons learned:* Among the violations that the UN-led MRM tracks are attacks on schools, including on students and teachers. Efforts to engage communities in reporting these violations show how important it is for external actors to provide feedback. In Côte d'Ivoire, MRM data has primarily been collected through informal networks made up of school inspectors, regional education district officers, UN agencies, and NGOs. Although community-based Child Protection Committees (CPCs) were intended to feed information from communities into the MRM, in practice, this system for reporting has not functioned well, with attacks against teachers and pupils going largely undocumented and only physical attacks against school structures (including damage, looting, and use of school buildings as barracks, weapons storage, and mass graves) being recorded. This is in part because CPCs in Côte d'Ivoire vary in whether or not they function. Additionally, while CPCs, which focus more on people, are trained to identify child protection cases and employ basic case management practices, they have not recorded and reported systematically on attacks on schools. Research in Ivorian communities indicated that this failure to report is in part due to a lack of understanding and awareness about the MRM and its purposes. Only a handful of key informants mentioned monthly data collection, and even they did not know the purpose of the information sharing process. The information gap is compounded because it is often difficult to determine whether individuals are injured because of general conflict-related violence or because they are directly targeted because of their status as educators. More comprehensive feedback to CPCs and local communities on the purpose of the MRM and the types of information that need to be collected could increase motivation to report the relevant incidents.

Conclusion

The case of Côte d'Ivoire illustrates a range of ways in which communities might participate in the protection of education: building and contributing to early warning systems, providing human and material resources to protect schools, negotiating with armed groups, and feeding into monitoring and reporting systems. Research from Côte d'Ivoire also demonstrates how important it is to carefully plan and consider how to work with local communities towards the protection of education. It suggests that, in situations of conflict, communities remain concerned with maintaining their children's education.

Nevertheless, there is significant potential for missteps when engaging local communities, and doing so can not only damage program effectiveness but inflame existing tensions, putting students, teachers, and their schools at even greater risk. As the successes and errors described in this case study show, external actors must develop in-depth and detailed knowledge about the communities, as well as strong relationships with community members, in order to successfully implement initiatives protecting education. Making mistakes—either because of a lack of contextual knowledge or for any other reason—can decrease trust between communities and external actors and within communities themselves.

Among the challenges and potential pitfalls when working with communities to protect education are the following:

- Variations in the composition of communities means that one model of response does not fit all contexts. The issue of addressing attacks against education requires a highly sensitive and time and labour intensive approach that accounts for cultural differences and ensures that tensions are not exacerbated.
- Ethnic and cultural divisions between national staff, education personnel and community level groups, may reflect the divisions that are at the heart of the conflict. This may lead to antagonism between education structures and the communities in which they are based.
- There may be language barriers between international and national agency staff and the community groups with which they work, particu-

larly in remote locations. This can contribute to misunderstandings between external actors and communities.

- Where literacy rates are low, relying on written forms of communication, as INGOs and UN agencies often do, may limit outreach and feedback.⁸⁵
- Communities may not be inclined to maintain support, such as volunteerism and resource donation, for a program over the long term. This can increase dependence on limited government or donor funding, and, in the worst case, lead to a cessation of activities,⁸⁶ contradicting the assumption that community action is more sustainable.
- Donor funding in conflict settings tends to be short term, seeking quick impact, often without longer term planning. This is often incompatible with effective local-level collaboration, since developing contextual knowledge and building strong and trusting relationships takes time.
- Certain villages and communities may oppose specific aspects of education. Where education staff are viewed as aligned with a national or foreign government, tensions between communities and school personnel may be high.
- If adequate and effective feedback mechanisms are not put in place from the outset, it is difficult to build trust, and communities may become more and more reluctant to collaborate with external actors in the future.

Only by recognizing and addressing these challenges can program actions implemented in collaboration with communities be successful. Working with local communities has significant potential for protecting education. Keeping in mind the twelve steps outlined in this paper and ensuring the programs are comprehensively monitored and remain adaptable can enable external practitioners, planners, and policymakers to productively and effectively keep students, teachers, and their schools safe.

Conclusion and recommendations

While the outcome or impact of engaging communities in protective mechanisms is not rigorously documented or evaluated, humanitarian principles and codes of conduct⁸⁷ assume that collaboration with local individuals and groups is a ‘best practice.’ Practitioners also report that working with communities improves program design and implementation, relevance, and sustainability, and lowers costs. This assumption that community engagement is intrinsically positive can be seen in guidance and reports on the protection of education, which tend to promote collaboration with communities as a protective measure.⁸⁸

However, this paper indicates that there remains limited understanding of how different forms of community engagement and strategies for engaging communities may impact program outcomes—either positively or negatively. Furthermore, conflict-related dynamics, such as the forms and motivations for attacks on education, may inform how best to engage communities in protecting their schools, students, and teachers.

A review of documentation on community engagement in protection and education generated primarily positive and active examples of community engagement in projects implemented by external actors. This may be because this material is reviewed from a UN or NGO perspective. However, research in Côte d’Ivoire contradicted this perspective. There, communities visited reported feeling frequently unsupported or engaged only superficially. In the absence of strong and sustained external support, communities have occasionally taken it upon themselves to protect education and increase access to it. A stronger understanding of these efforts, community perceptions on working with external actors, and of the relative benefits of working with communities is necessary for strengthening relationships between local, national, and international partners.

The following recommendations are made based on these broad conclusions and the information gathered and detailed above:

Further research:

- *Conduct additional research on community engagement:* To inform programming and ensure that it is effective, detailed and rigorous, research is needed on:
 - The relative benefits and risks of community engagement in protective action, including prevention, mitigation, response actions, and during different steps in the project development, implementation, and monitoring process.
 - The forms of community engagement that enhance different types of program effectiveness, and under what conditions.

Donors:

- *Allocate longer-term funding for education protection programs in conflict-affected states:* Funding should go beyond immediate emergency response and support both recovery and conflict preparedness in order to enable UN agencies and INGOs to build strong and trusting relationships with communities.
- *Invest in new technologies for early warning and alternative education delivery:* Case study research in Côte d'Ivoire indicated that there is great potential for technology to support early warning systems and alternative education to protect education in conflict settings. Donors should invest money to explore and pilot how these technologies can be applied.
- *Allocate sufficient allocation of funding in all grants for research, monitoring and evaluation:* Additional funding for international agencies to assess and research the impact and outcomes of their efforts to protect education would enable future application of lessons learned.

UN agencies and INGOs:

- *Collaborate with secondary schools:* Côte d'Ivoire research indicated that certain forms of attack on education, including sexual abuse of girls on their way to and from school and boys being recruiting into armed groups at school, are significant threats for children attending secondary school. However, UN and INGO efforts are often focused on primary education. Close collabo-

ration with protection teams and communities could allow education teams to indirectly support secondary education and secondary school-aged children, even without funding to implement secondary education programs.

- *Invest in building trust:* Case study research underscored the high importance of building trusting relationships within communities and between communities and NGOs and UN agencies seeking to work in them. This is particularly important in contexts of conflict, during which political and ethnic tensions and mistrust may be heightened and exaggerated.
- *Develop collaboration between education and child protection actors in implementing the MRM, setting up and supporting community groups, and engaging in community mobilization and awareness-raising:*
 - Child protection actors have pre-existing mechanisms for reporting and managing data collected on individuals who experience violence, and abuse. Engaging these in MRM reporting could help overcome challenges in tracking incidents of attack against teachers, school administration, and children.
 - Increased collaboration, including joint needs assessment, planning, monitoring and evaluation, between education and child protection actors could help avoid duplication of efforts where both set up community-level committees to address issues facing children. This is important to avoid competition for volunteer time and community resources. Additionally, because community mobilization and awareness-raising is time consuming, joint workshops, events, and activities may help preserve human resources.
- *Learn more about pre-existing community responses:* As Côte d'Ivoire indicates, communities may develop their own methods for protecting education. INGOs and UN agencies should more systematically and thoroughly invest in collecting information about these mechanisms since they could help develop innovative protection strategies.

Appendices

APPENDIX 1:

Typology of Community Engagement

This four-level typology of community engagement has been adapted from a typology of community participation used by child protection actors to classify ways of engaging communities in activities to achieve children's well-being.⁸⁹ The categories of engagement set out below indicate interconnected and sometimes overlapping ways that communities can be engaged by external actors at the outset of the activity and take on levels of responsibility. These include: community-initiated, community-implemented, community-inspired, and community involved.

Community-initiated: These program activities are conceived and set-up by community members, based on parameters established by them. They are also managed, implemented, and resourced by communities themselves. Maintained action is reliant entirely on community motivation.

Community-implemented: Groups external to the community conceive of and design program activities, but rely on community members to manage, support, and/or resource them. The assumption justifying this model is that when an external actor's funding ends community volunteerism will sustain the intervention.

Community-inspired: Community groups conceive of and develop projects, but rely on some form of external support (human resources, skills, knowledge, advocacy or funding) to fully implement them. External actors may play a significant role in management and rollout of activities.

Community-involved: External actors conceive of program activities, but solicit community perspectives on implementation through participatory processes. Community members do not typically play a role in decision-making or management. They may volunteer occasionally to support the project, but do not serve as long-term human resources. The intervention is only likely to continue as long as the external funding stream is available.

Each of the different measures to protect education may involve different forms of community engagement. Different forms of support may be more or less realistic

or effective depending on the contextual factors, such as the nature of attacks or community values with regards to education. Furthermore, activities may start out with one form of engagement and then evolve into another. For instance, an activity may originally be community-initiated but then be emulated by external actors, such as UN agencies, NGOs or the government, who bring that intervention to communities in other locations. It thus may become a community-involved activity. Within one setting, community, or program, it is also possible that several different actions will be carried out with different forms of engagement. Program planners can use this typology to consider different options for community engagement at different stages of the project implementation process. Decisions should be made based on analysis of how each option may help or hinder achievement of the desired outcomes. Which approach an NGO, UN agency, or government ministry decides to take will shape their staffing, funding, and operations.

Forms of Community Engagement: Case Examples

COMMUNITY-INITIATED: Children and parents in Côte d'Ivoire use SMS services on their mobile phones to monitor the safety of children going to and from school. Parents also accompany their children to and from school during times of conflict.

COMMUNITY-IMPLEMENTED: UN agencies, INGOs, and the MoE in the DRC initiate school management committees. Community guards to protect schools in Afghanistan, initially supported by the government, are now the responsibility of communities themselves.

COMMUNITY-INSPIRED: Communities initiate alternative forms of education, such as bush-schools in CAR and community schools in Afghanistan. Governments, international NGOs, and UN agencies then adopt and scale up these interventions.

COMMUNITY-INVOLVED: In rapid onset emergencies, international agencies solicit input from communities on the design, implementation, and evaluation of projects to provide temporary learning spaces. During the post-election violence in Côte d'Ivoire in 2011, NGOs set up temporary learning spaces in camp settings, after communities fled.⁹⁰ Because TLS needed to be established quickly, the degree to which the NGOs could engage community participation was limited. However, community perspectives were solicited to inform program design and monitoring.

APPENDIX 2:

Working with and through local NGOs

The following are examples of INGOs cooperating with local NGOs to engage local communities.

- *SZoP in Nepal:*⁹¹ In Nepal, Save the Children implemented a SZoP program through local partner organizations, often working with Village Child Protection Committees previously set up by the INGO. Working through these local groups and other local organizations, Save the Children recruited members of the local community to work as social mobilizers to support and facilitate the development of local committees and child clubs. Child clubs and SMCs were instrumental in promoting and monitoring the intervention. They enabled communities to be more involved in project development and to play a central role in agreeing on the terms of the Codes of Conduct for teachers, students, and the community.
- *Implementing the MRM with local NGOs in Nepal:*⁹² Nepal's Country Taskforce on the MRM found that working with local NGOs meant that children and communities were more comfortable sharing information than they would have been if they were reporting to external agencies. They preferred to report incidents verbally to the local organizations, rather than using the complaints boxes set up by the INGOs.
- *Mindanao Peoples Caucus monitoring violations in the Philippines:*⁹³ The Mindanao Peoples Caucus (MPC), formed in January 2003, trained 3,500 local volunteers, called the Bantay Ceasefire group, to monitor and report violations of the ceasefire agreement between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the government. Although their mandate is not specific to education, it includes monitoring attacks on schools. It is believed that knowledge of a civilian-led monitoring team watching and reporting on violations made armed actors more cautious.

APPENDIX 3:

Child participation in practice

The following are examples of regional and international actors engaging children in protecting their own rights, including the right to education.

- *The Children’s Network (Red de Niños) of Colombia:*⁹⁴ This children’s movement in Colombia has brought together children affected by the conflict and violence. Children from different regions select representatives to advocate on specific issues that concern them. They have been involved in:
 - Writing a letter to the churches in Colombia, urging them to work on specific issues that concern children
 - Presenting the concerns of children at the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on Children
 - Campaigning for peace and for the release of those kidnapped by paramilitary and guerrilla forces at local level
- *Children’s clubs in Nepal:*⁹⁵ As part of Save the Children’s SZoP projects in Nepal, children’s clubs and peer networks helped ensure that learning continued in places where fighting was too intense for schools to stay open. These clubs, along with CPCs and SMCs, were believed to be one of the most important factors determining the successful implementation of SZoP. They reportedly helped children gain awareness of and confidence in defending their rights as children to adults, including school authority figures and political groups.

Best practices in involving children in implementing the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism⁹⁶

To monitor abuses against children in conflict settings, the MRM, established by the United Nations, is managed by a country taskforce, which relies on reports from children, communities, civil society groups, NGOs, and UN agencies. Children should participate in this process, both as survivors/victims of violations and as agents of protection themselves. In some situations, children, under adult supervision, have been involved in reporting, advocacy, awareness, and alert activities

through their communities and in schools. Children may directly report the details of incidents of grave violations, such as attacks on schools, sexual violence, or recruitment. For example, in DRC, children’s clubs, along with SMCs and PTAs, were trained and encouraged to report violations of children’s rights through the MRM.⁹⁷ In addition children’s clubs in targeted schools were trained and encouraged to participate in the MRM. Children have also undertaken local awareness activities in conflict-affected areas to inform parents and other children about their rights and reporting systems.

In involving children in this way, it is important that special care and consideration is taken to ensure their well-being and safety. Reporting should not increase the risk of children or their communities to threat, attack, or other violence. The best interests of the child, and the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and do no or less harm, guide the implementation of the MRM.

APPENDIX 4: Côte d'Ivoire Methodology

Information was collected for the case study from several sources. Thirty-five semi-structured interviews with key informants were carried out at the national, regional, and local levels, including with *Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale et de l'Enseignement Technique* - Ministry of National Education and Technical Training (MENET) officials, UN agency staff, NGO staff, *Direction Régionale de l'Éducation Nationale et de l'Enseignement Technique* (DRENET) officials, members of local *Comité de Gestion des Établissements Scolaires* – COGES, and school principals.

In addition, three communities were visited, selected because: a) their schools experienced attacks during 2010-2011 post-electoral crisis; b) the community took action in response to these attacks; and c) the school communities had contact with an NGO or UN agency, enabling the authors to gain access for research purposes. Two school communities in rural locations in the west and a high school community in the economic capital in the south were visited. These are the regions that were worst affected by fighting during the 2010-2011 crisis. During these visits, a total of 15 focus group discussions took place, including 123 individuals.⁹⁸ These included:

- School going children (5 girls and 5 boys between 13 and 16 years old)
- Non-school going children (5 girls and 5 boys between 13 and 16 years old)
- COGES executive committee members (10-13 members)
- Women from the community (10 women)
- The village chief and council⁹⁹
- Religious leaders¹⁰⁰

In general, the interviews and focus group discussions sought to understand community attitudes toward education, community initiatives to protect education, successes and challenges in the protection of education, and the role of external actors in supporting the protection of education. Focus group participants were reimbursed for transportation but were not paid or given any other incentives to provide information.

Interviewees were given no incentives to provide information.

Finally, project and program documents were collected from government, NGOs, and UN agencies, in addition to news releases, situation reports, and government communiqués. These provided background information on the situation of education in Côte d'Ivoire and details on specific program activities discussed.

Limitations: There were a number of limitations to the case study research. Time constraints meant that only three sites in two regions of the country were visited. Given how widespread attacks on education in Côte d'Ivoire are, according to the country's Education Cluster,¹⁰¹ data collected from these three sites cannot be considered systematic or representative of the overall response to protecting education from attack in Côte d'Ivoire. Data collection on the 2002 crisis was impeded by a high turnover rate of staff in government, NGOs and UN agencies, low institutional memory, and the time that has passed since the 2002 crisis. Additionally, interview and focus group participants often merged issues of attacks on education and access to education. Therefore, it was difficult to disaggregate the two discussions.

Endnotes

- ¹ For example, Glad, M. (2009). *Knowledge on Fire: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan: Risks and Measures for Successful Mitigation*. Kabul, Afghanistan: CARE.
- ² O'Malley (2010). *Education Under Attack 2010*. Paris: UNESCO, p. 10. Watchlist (2012). *No one to trust: Children and Armed Conflict in Colombia*. New York: Watchlist, p. 37.
- ³ See, e.g. Groneman, C. (2011). *Study on Field-based Programmatic Measures to Protect Education from Attack*. New York: GCPEA, p. 13-15.
- ⁴ UNICEF (2011). *The Role of Education in Peacebuilding: Case Study – Nepal*. New York: UNICEF.
- ⁵ Glad, M. (2009). *Knowledge on Fire: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan: Risks and Measures for Successful Mitigation*. Kabul, Afghanistan: CARE, p. 3.
- ⁶ Burde, D. (2010). Preventing violent attacks on education in Afghanistan: Considering the role of community-based schools. In UNESCO, *Protecting Education from Attack: A State of the Art Review*. Paris: UNESCO, p. 257.
- ⁷ Ellery, F. and Webley, K. (2010) *The Future is Now: Education for Children in Countries Affected by Conflict*. London, UK: Save the Children, p. 50.
- ⁸ See, e.g., Save the Children (2009). *Rewrite the Future Global Evaluation Nepal Midterm Country Report*. Kathmandu, Nepal: Save the Children, p. 11.
- ⁹ Previous research by the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack [Groneman (2011)] lists the programmatic measures to protect education from attack under four broad headings, Protection, Prevention, Advocacy, and Monitoring, with community involvement listed as a specific form of action under the category of "Protection." Here we see community involvement as an option in *all* forms of protective action, and thus we will be looking at the full range of programmatic interventions.
- ¹⁰ Definition based on material found in Action for the Rights of Children (2009). *Foundation module 6: Community mobilization*. Geneva: ARC, p. 10; Child Protection Working Group Sudan (2012). *Working with Community-Based Child Protection Committees and Networks: Handbook for Facilitators*. Hong Kong: Child Frontiers, p. 76.
- ¹¹ Thompson, H. (2014). The role of communities in protecting education. In Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack, *Education Under Attack 2014*. New York: GCPEA, p. 86.
- ¹² For full details of the typology see Appendix 1.
- ¹³ Prior to selecting Côte d'Ivoire as the location for research, twenty community-based groups were contacted by telephone and asked if they had been attacked, and what they had done in response to attacks on education.
- ¹⁴ In fact, mobilizing communities is recognized as a means of enabling the generation of local solutions that are tailored to diverse settings. See Howard-Grabman, L. and Snetro, G. (2003). *How to mobilize communities for health and social change*. Baltimore, MD: Health Communication Partnership.
- ¹⁵ The steps outlined in this report are based on the actions proposed for implementing programs that mobilize communities, as presented in the following publications: Wessells, M. (2009). *What Are We Learning about Protecting Children in the Community? An inter-agency review of the evidence on community-based child protection mechanisms in humanitarian and development settings*. Save the Children Fund; Inter-Agency Standing Committee (2007). Action sheets 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4. In *Guidelines on Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in Emergency Settings - Section on Community mobilization & support*. Geneva: IASC; Child Protection Working Group (2012). *Minimum standards for child protection in humanitarian action*. CPWG; Howard-Grabman, L. and Snetro, G. (2003). *How to mobilize communities for health and social change*. Baltimore, MD: Health Communication Partnership.
- ¹⁶ Learning Institutions or Schools as Zones of Peace is an initiative implemented by a variety of agencies, including UNICEF and Save the Children. Building on the concept of "children as zones of peace"—the idea that children should be protected and should have access to services essential to their well-being—it typically consists of negotiations between school communities and armed groups to make school settings off limits.
- ¹⁷ Save the Children (2009). *Rewrite the Future Global Evaluation Nepal Midterm Country Report*. Kathmandu, Nepal: Save the Children, p. 9.
- ¹⁸ The LIZOP process in The Philippines builds upon and is underpinned by national legislation, which is shared with local communities through the coordination mechanisms that are integral to the project. See Diaries, Brenda K. (2012). *A Situational Assessment of Attacks on Education in the Philippines*. Davao City, Philippines: Save the Children; and Sheppard, B. and Knight, K. (2011). *Disarming schools: strategies for ending the military use of schools during armed conflict*. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.
- ¹⁹ Watchlist (2008). *Getting It Done and Doing It Right: Implementing the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on Children and Armed Conflict in Uganda*. New York: Watchlist.
- ²⁰ See, e.g. Shrestha, M. (2012). *The Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on Grave Violations against Children in Armed Conflict in Nepal 2005 – 2012: A Civil Society Perspective*. New York: Watchlist, p. 8.
- ²¹ In 2005, the UN Country Team in Uganda elected to implement the UN-led Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism. In May 2006, the United Nations established the Uganda Taskforce on Monitoring and Reporting. Co-chaired by UNICEF and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Taskforce's members also include the Uganda Human Rights Commission, Save the Children in Uganda, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
- ²² The full list of participants is as follows: The child protection and gender-based violence (GBV) sub-clusters, the Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) cluster, UNHCR-supported camp management programs, service providers, and other NGOs.
- ²³ CPCs were first established in Uganda in 2005 to more efficiently coordinate the initiatives of child protection agencies and district authorities. Since 2005, more than 130 CPCs have been established throughout Acholi, Lango and Teso regions.
- ²⁴ Johnson, S., Sbardella, D., Odaymat, F., and Alam, S. (2011, May 11-12). *Protecting the rights of Palestinian children affected by armed conflict through community-based mechanisms in the Gaza Strip and North Lebanon*. Regional Workshop in Amman, Jordan. Beirut, Lebanon: Save the Children Sweden, p. 11-12.
- ²⁵ O'Malley, B. (ed.), and Smith, M., with Ashton, C., Prelis, S., Wheaton, W., Sinclair, M. (2012). *Case Study 4: Nepal: Negotiating a 'Schools as Zones of Peace' agreement*. In Global Education Cluster. *Protecting Education in Countries Affected by Conflict Booklet 3: Community-based Protection and Prevention*. Geneva: Global Education Cluster, p. 11-12; See also, Davies, L. (2012). *Breaking the Cycle of Crisis: Learning from Save the Children's Delivery of Education in Conflict-Affected Fragile States*. London, UK: Save the Children.
- ²⁶ Ellery, F. with Webley, K. (2010). *The Future is Now: Education for Children in Countries Affected by Conflict, Save the Children*. Regional Workshop in Amman, Jordan. London, UK: Save the Children, p. 13.
- ²⁷ Communities appear to be more likely to support peace-building activities when they receive assistance in meeting their basic needs. For example, see Iyer, P. (2004). *Peace Zones of Mindanao, Philippines: Civil Society Efforts to End Violence*. Cambridge, MA: Collaborative Learning Projects, p. 22.
- ²⁸ Pswarayi, L. and Reeler, T. (2012). *Fragility and education in Zimbabwe: Assessing the impact of violence on education*. Harare, Zimbabwe: Research and Advocacy Unit; Norwegian Students' and Academics' International Assistance Fund (SAIH) (2012). *The language of the police batons: attacks on teachers and students in Zimbabwe*. SAIH; and Personal Correspondence with key informant, May 2013.

- ²⁹ School development committees (SDCs) are bodies that are democratically elected by parents and communities on an annual basis. They provide communities members a voice in school management decision-making. For example, see Boonstopel, E. and Chikohomero, R. (2011). *School Development Committee Capacity Reinforcement Project in Zimbabwe*. SNV Netherlands Development Organization.
- ³⁰ Groneman, C. (2011). *Study on Field-based Programmatic Measures to Protect Education from Attack*. New York: GCPEA, p. 66.
- ³¹ Personal Correspondence with key informant, May 2013.
- ³² Personal Correspondence with key informant, May 2013.
- ³³ Assessment Working Group for Northern Syria (2013). *Joint Rapid Assessment of Northern Syria: Final Report*; Human Rights Watch (2013). *Safe No More: Students and Schools under Attack in Syria*. New York: HRW.
- ³⁴ In Syria, the conflict between government and rebel groups has led to the death and departure of many teachers. Thousands of school buildings have been damaged, and thousands more have been occupied by the internally displaced. Parents have stopped sending their children to school for fear for their safety, resulting in a significant reduction in school attendance. The Ministry of Education has stated that in the areas worst affected by fighting, the percentage of children attending school may be as low as 14 percent. In its February 2013 report, the UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria stated that “[s]chool attendances ranges from 38 to 100 percent across government-controlled areas,” and that attendance “appears severely limited” in opposition-controlled areas. The Ministry of Education announced in November 2012 that only 14 percent of children attend school in the northern Aleppo governorate, where the fighting has been particularly intense. Cited in Human Rights Watch (2013). *Safe No More: Students and Schools under Attack in Syria*. New York: HRW, p. 4.
- ³⁵ The assessment methodology included interviews with a range of community actors, including relief committees, religious leaders, local organizations, heads of households, medical staff, and local police as well as direct observation of public places such as schools, hospitals, water points, markets, or small shops. A review of existing literature, secondary data and agency, or sector specific assessments also took place. Careful attention was made to ensure that there were mixed teams of enumerators, and to avoid bias, verification procedures were put in place.
- ³⁶ Boonstopel, E., et al. (2008). *Building School-Community Relations through Empowerment of School Development Committees in Zimbabwe*. SNV Netherlands Development Organization.
- ³⁷ Save the Children (2009). *Rewrite the Future Global Evaluation Nepal Midterm Country Report*. Kathmandu, Nepal: Save the Children.
- ³⁸ Emergency Capacity Building Project (2007). *Impact Measurement and Accountability in Emergencies: Good enough guide*. Herndon, VA: Oxfam GB and World Vision International, p. 8.
- ³⁹ See for example, Csaky, C. (2009). *No One to Turn To: The under-reporting of sexual violence against children by peacekeepers and aid workers*. London, UK: Save the Children, p. 16.
- ⁴⁰ Save the Children (2011). *Guide to a child friendly complaints system. Lesson learned from Dadaab Refugee Camps*. Based on the proceedings of a workshop in Dadaab Refugee Camps, Kenya. For guidance on the 10 steps to setting up a Complaints Response Mechanisms, see the video available at: <http://aimstandingteam.wordpress.com/2012/03/08/save-the-childrens-short-video-on-complaints-and-response-mechanisms/>
- ⁴¹ The desks were set-up in Child Friendly Spaces, at refugee check-in desks, and in NGO offices in camps and host communities. They dealt with general complaints and feedback with regards to all program implementation by all agencies present in the camp. Certain cases were referred to NGO supervisors—particularly sensitive cases, such as those involving sexual violence, staff misconduct, or dissatisfaction with the way previous feedback had been handled.
- ⁴² One BRG was linked with each information desk. The groups consist of nine members: four camp leaders (two male and two female), three religious leaders, and two teachers. These representatives were selected in a meeting held with religious and camp leaders. BRGs were involved in monthly feedback meetings.
- ⁴³ This example is based on the author’s own research into an INGO’s program integrating education and child protection to prevent child labour after an emergency.
- ⁴⁴ See for example, Watchlist (2008). *Getting It Done and Doing It Right: Implementing the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on Children and Armed Conflict in Uganda*. New York: Watchlist, p. 6; Shrestha, M. (2012). *The Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on Grave Violations against Children in Armed Conflict in Nepal 2005 – 2012: A Civil Society Perspective*. New York: Watchlist, p. 8.
- ⁴⁵ Child Workers in Nepal (2008, November 24). *Nepal Case Study: Schools as Zones of Peace*. PowerPoint Presentation. Retrieved April 24, 2013 from http://www.powershow.com/view/5706-NjkoN/NEPAL_CASE_STUDY_SCHOOLS_AS_ZONES_OF_PEACE_powerpoint_ppt_presentation, slide 7.
- ⁴⁶ BBC Profile: Malala Yousafzai. *BBC News*. (2013, July 11).; Malala Yousafzai Named To Time’s 100 Most Influential People and Huffington Post. (2013, April 18). *Huffington Post*.
- ⁴⁷ Other negotiations, such as the establishment of Schools as Zones of Peace, were carried out publicly. Stakeholders were invited to public meetings; Codes of Conduct were launched at community events; and posters detailing decisions were placed in public spaces. The advantage of “back-door” negotiations can be that they are more discrete, reducing risk to those engaging in discussions. In places like Nepal, where speaking with Maoists may put stakeholders at risk, this can be an advantage. UNICEF (2011). *The Role of Education in Peacebuilding: Case Study – Nepal*. New York: UNICEF, p. 40; See also, Shrestha, B. (2008). *A Mapping of SZoP Programs in Nepal*. Kathmandu, Nepal; and Child Workers in Nepal (2008, November 24). *Nepal Case Study: Schools as Zones of Peace*. PowerPoint Presentation. Retrieved April 24, 2013 from http://www.powershow.com/view/5706-NjkoN/NEPAL_CASE_STUDY_SCHOOLS_AS_ZONES_OF_PEACE_powerpoint_ppt_presentation.
- ⁴⁸ Shrestha, M. (2012). *The Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on Grave Violations against Children in Armed Conflict in Nepal 2005 – 2012: A Civil Society Perspective*. New York: Watchlist.
- ⁴⁹ *Ibid*, p. 9.
- ⁵⁰ Johnson, S., Sbardella, D., Odaymat, F., and Alam, S. (2011, May 11-12). *Protecting the rights of Palestinian children affected by armed conflict through community-based mechanisms in the Gaza Strip and North Lebanon*. Regional Workshop in Amman, Jordan. Beirut, Lebanon: Save the Children Sweden.
- ⁵¹ Rai, U., Majumdar, S., and Jain, R. (2012). *Bal Bandhu: In Defence of Child Rights*. Delhi, India: National Commission for Protection of Child Rights.
- ⁵² Communities took initial steps to prevent children from being recruited to armed conflict or trafficked. Communities, along with women’s groups, youth groups, and *gram panchayats*—local self-governments at the village or small town level in India—tracked every child in their area.
- ⁵³ The 20 resource persons selected had considerable experience in working in conflict-affected areas. Some of them had worked with the Sarva Siksha Abhiyan (SSA) (Translation: The Education for All Movement), the Government of India’s flagship program for achieving the Universalisation of Elementary Education (UEE). See website for further details: <http://www.ssa.nic.in/>. They, therefore, had experience in mobilizing communities for child rights.
- ⁵⁴ Iyer, P. (2004). *Peace Zones of Mindanao, Philippines: Civil Society Efforts to End Violence*. Cambridge, MA: Collaborative Learning Projects.
- ⁵⁵ See Hirsch, A. (2013, May 9). Nigerian sect Boko Haram demands Islamic state. *The Guardian*. Retrieved July 29, 2013 from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/may/09/boko-haram-nigeria-islamist-state>.
- ⁵⁶ These recommendations are based on the author’s own experience working in Côte d’Ivoire.
- ⁵⁷ See UNESCO (2011). Monitoring progress on financing Education for All. In *EFA Global Monitoring Report: The hidden crisis: Armed conflict and education*. Paris: UNESCO, p. 25; and Global Child Protection Working Group (2011). *Too Little, Too Late: Child protection funding in emergencies*. CPWG, p. 4.

- ⁵⁸ UNESCO (2010). Key findings and Implications. In UNESCO. *Protecting Education from Attack: A state of the art review*. Paris: UNESCO, p. 28.
- ⁵⁹ Groneman, C. (2011). *Study on Field-based Programmatic Measures to Protect Education from Attack*. New York: GCPEA, p. 34.
- ⁶⁰ Watchlist/International Displacement Monitoring Centre (2011). *An Uncertain Future? Children and Armed Conflict in the Central African Republic*. New York: Watchlist/IDMC.
- ⁶¹ Johnson, S., Sbardella, D., Odaymat, F., and Alam, S. (2011, May 11-12). *Protecting the rights of Palestinian children affected by armed conflict through community-based mechanisms in the Gaza Strip and North Lebanon*. Regional Workshop in Amman, Jordan. Beirut, Lebanon: Save the Children Sweden, p. 25.
- ⁶² UNESCO (2010). Key findings and Implications. In UNESCO. *Protecting Education from Attack: A state of the art review*. Paris: UNESCO, p. 10. For example, in Afghanistan, local community members were no longer making a distinction between organizations working with the military and those that were not. This was associated with a breakdown in trust between communities and humanitarian and development organizations, increasing threats to aid workers.
- ⁶³ Key informant interview, NGO education program manager, Afghanistan.
- ⁶⁴ Groneman, C. (2011). *Study on Field-based Programmatic Measures to Protect Education from Attack*. New York: GCPEA, p. 18-19.
- ⁶⁵ UNHCR (2013). *Protection Policy Paper: Understanding Community-Based Protection*. Geneva: UNHCR Division of International Protection, p. 14.
- ⁶⁶ Based on information from Ivory Coast Profile. (2013, June 18). BBC News. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13287585>; Time Line: Ivory Coast. (2011, November 30). *Al Jazeera*. Retrieved from <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2010/12/201012191745317811.html>; United Nations Security Council (2006). *Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Côte d'Ivoire*. S/2006/835. New York: UNSC; Oved, M.C. (2010, December 31). UN Troops walk Tightrope in Ivory Coast. *The Globe and Mail*. Retrieved October 16, 2013 from <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/un-troops-walk-tightrope-in-ivory-coast/article1321812/>; and Côte d'Ivoire on the Edge: A New Displacement Crisis in West Africa. UNHCR. Retrieved October 22, 2013 from <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4d831f586.html>.
- ⁶⁷ UNSC (2006) Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Côte d'Ivoire, S/2006/835, para. 2. This report covers the period from January 2005 to September 2006
- ⁶⁸ Chelpi-den Hamer, M. (2013). *When war enters the school: Impact of the Ivorian crisis on the local educational system, Government responses, Strategies to accompany the process of national reconciliation*. UNICEF.
- ⁶⁹ Ibid.
- ⁷⁰ Côte d'Ivoire Education Cluster (2011, June 15). *Attaques Contre l'Éducation: Rapport sur l'impact de la crise sur le système éducatif Ivoirien, Rapport Numéro 2*, p. 3.
- ⁷¹ United Nations Security Council (2012). *Children and Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General*, A/66/782-S/2012/261, para. 32.. New York: UNSC. This report covers the period from January to December 2011.
- ⁷² Chelpi-den Hamer, M. (2013). *When war enters the school: Impact of the Ivorian crisis on the local educational system, Government responses, Strategies to accompany the process of national reconciliation*. UNICEF. Participants in FDGs and KIs noted that school re-openings varied. Individual school administrations decided when to re-open schools based on the local political environmental and the intensity of fighting in their area.
- ⁷³ According to the Côte d'Ivoire Education Cluster, Abidjan's Education Districts 1, 3 & 4 reported 112 reported; Guiglo in Moyen Cavally reported 31 education attacks; and Dalao in Haut Sassandra reported 31 attacks. Côte d'Ivoire Education Cluster (2011, June 15). *Attaques Contre l'Éducation: Rapport sur l'impact de la crise sur le système éducatif Ivoirien, Rapport Numéro 2*, p. 3.
- ⁷⁴ Some of these attacks are attributed to the Rally of the Houphouëtistes for Democracy and Peace (RHDP), which allegedly wounded teachers, administrative staff, and school directors who did not respect civil orders given by Ouattara's Government. RHDP is a coalition of political parties that includes the Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire (Parti démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire), the African Democratic Rally (PDCI-RDA), the Movement of the Forces of the Future (MFA) and the Union for Democracy, and Peace in Côte d'Ivoire (UDPCI). See Côte d'Ivoire Education Cluster (2011, June 15). *Attaques Contre l'Éducation: Rapport sur l'impact de la crise sur le système éducatif Ivoirien, Rapport Numéro 2*, p. 8.
- ⁷⁵ UN-affiliated interviewees were from UNICEF, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and *Opération des Nations Unies en Côte d'Ivoire* (the UN's Peacekeeping mission in Côte d'Ivoire, ONUCI).
- ⁷⁶ NGO staff interviews were carried out with both child protection and education personnel.
- ⁷⁷ Interviews were carried out with UN staff (6), NGO staff (6), MENET officials (3), DRENET officials (8), COGES Regional Coordinators (3), COGES leaders (3), and school principals (5).
- ⁷⁸ CNPRA (2005). *Bilan du PNRA*. Retrieved from http://www.seydoelimanediarr.net/carriere_CNPRA.html.
- ⁷⁹ See, e.g. Burde, D. (2010). Preventing violent attacks on education in Afghanistan: Considering the role of community-based schools. In UNESCO, *Protecting Education from Attack: A State of the Art Review*. Paris: UNESCO, p. 257.
- ⁸⁰ Côte d'Ivoire has a 75% mobile phone penetration rate, meaning that there are three mobile phone lines for every four inhabitants
- ⁸¹ Vedsted, S. and Coulibaly, J. (2011, January). Joint Evaluation of the Rewrite the Future Program 2006 – 2009 in Côte d'Ivoire. Save the Children Sweden.
- ⁸² Ibid.
- ⁸³ Community level interviews and FGDs described this as a positive example of working with an INGO. The steps outlined explain some of the reason why the community felt this was a positive working relationship.
- ⁸⁴ COGES and parents were responsible for fundraising and providing what materials and labor they could.
- ⁸⁵ Save the Children (2009). *Rewrite the Future Global Evaluation Nepal Midterm Country Report*. Kathmandu, Nepal: Save the Children, p. 24.
- ⁸⁶ Liberia's unarmed guards became a permanent fixture, with costs paid by the school. UNESCO (2010). Key findings and Implications. In UNESCO. *Protecting Education from Attack: A state of the art review*. Paris: UNESCO, p. 10.
- ⁸⁷ For details of the Humanitarian Principles see ICRC (1996). Annex VI: The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief. Retrieved from <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/code-of-conduct-290296.htm>. For how the Code of Conduct and associated principles apply to other organizations engaged in humanitarian activities, see OCHA (2012). *OCHA on Message: Humanitarian Principles*. Retrieved from https://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/OOM-humanitarianprinciples_eng_June12.pdf.
- ⁸⁸ See for example, UNESCO (2010). *Protecting Education from Attack: A state of the art review*. Paris: UNESCO, p. 33; and Global Education Cluster. *Protecting Education in Countries Affected by Conflict Booklet 3: Community-based Protection and Prevention*. Geneva: Global Education Cluster.
- ⁸⁹ This adapted from the Interagency Learning Initiative's (ILI) four-category typology. See Benham, N (2008) *Agencies Communities and Children: A Report of the Interagency Learning Initiative: Engaging Communities for Children's Wellbeing*. Washington, DC: USAID.
- ⁹⁰ Deters, L. (2011, May 4). Ivory Coast: thousands of children still out of school. *Save the Children* [blog posting]. Retrieved May 26, 2013 from <http://blogs.savethechildren.org.uk/2011/05/ivory-coast-thousands-of-children-still-out-of-school/>.

⁹¹ Save the Children (2010) *Rewrite the Future Global Evaluation: Nepal Country Report*. Save the Children; Save the Children (2009). *Rewrite the Future Global Evaluation Nepal Midterm Country Report*. Kathmandu, Nepal: Save the Children.

⁹² Shrestha, M. (2012). *The Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on Grave Violations against Children in Armed Conflict in Nepal 2005 – 2012: A Civil Society Perspective*. New York: Watchlist.

⁹³ Diaries, Brenda K. (2012). A Situational Assessment of Attacks on Education in the Philippines. Davao City, Philippines: Save the Children; and Mindanao People's Caucus (n.d.). What is the Bantay Ceasefire? Retrieved May 7, 2013 http://www.mpc.org.ph/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=105&Itemid=87.

⁹⁴ Stephenson, P. with Gourley, S. and Miles, G. (2004). Child Participation. In Blackman, R., *Resourcing Organizations with Opportunities for Transformation and Sharing* (ROOTS 7). Teddington, UK: Tearfund.

⁹⁵ Save the Children (2009). *Rewrite the Future Global Evaluation Nepal Midterm Country Report*. Kathmandu, Nepal: Save the Children, p. 3; Save the Children (2011). *Rewrite the Future Global Evaluation Final Report*, p. 32.

⁹⁶ Details about the MRM are from O/SRSG-CAAC/UNICEF/DPKO (2011, April). *Field manual, Monitoring and reporting mechanism (MRM) on grave violations against children in situation of armed conflict*. Additional details on ensuring the well-being of children are based on the author's experience.

⁹⁷ Groneman, C. (2011). *Study on Field-based Programmatic Measures to Protect Education from Attack*. New York: GCPEA, p. 44.

⁹⁸ The researchers visited all three sites prior to FGDs to ensure the selection criteria were understood and to foster goodwill. Fifteen FGDs took place since, in some settings, not all participants could make FGDs on the chosen day. A total of 123 individuals participated in FGDs.


⁹⁹ At two research sites, the village chief could not meet at the arranged time.

¹⁰⁰ At one research site, the religious leaders could not meet at the arranged time.

¹⁰¹ Côte d'Ivoire Education Cluster (2011, June 15). *Attaques Contre l'Éducation: Rapport sur l'impact de la crise sur la système éducatif Ivoirien, Rapport Numéro 2*.

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
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Front cover: A teacher and school owner is seen with her pupils sitting in front of their school. The building was destroyed on August 4, 2009, during a wave of violence in Maiduguri, Nigeria.

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